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One important distinction in the debate over epistemic justification is the one between 
propositional and doxastic justification. Roughly, while doxastic justification is a property of 
beliefs, propositional justification is a property of propositions. On a rather common view, 
which accounts for doxastic justification in terms of propositional justification plus the so-
called ‘basing relation’, propositional justification is seen as the prior notion, and doxastic 
justification is explained in terms of it. According to the opposing view, the direction of 
explanation needs to be reversed, and doxastic justification should be seen as primary. I 
distinguish between two notions of priority, and I argue that they give different verdicts with 
respect to the issue of which notion of justification comes first. The lesson may be taken to be 
that propositional and doxastic justification are in a relation of intertwinement. 
 
Keywords: propositional justification; doxastic justification; conceptual priority; theoretical 
priority 
 
1. Preliminaries 
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Let me begin by briefly explaining the notions of priority I will be working with, the 
distinction between propositional and doxastic justification, and the main heuristic 
presupposition of the paper.  
Following Ichikawa and Jenkins [forthcoming: sec. 2], we can distinguish between 
metaphysical and representational families of priority. While representational priorities locate 
the priority in the way in which we think or talk about the relevant subject matter, 
metaphysical priorities locate the priority in something like the hierarchical structure of 
reality. One way to see the difference between the two families may be the following: if G is 
representationally prior to F, then cognitively engaging with F requires one to cognitively 
engage with G (while F-facts may not obtain in virtue of G-facts);1 by contrast, if G is 
metaphysically prior to F, then F-facts obtain at least in part in virtue of G-facts (but 
cognitively engaging with F needn’t require one to cognitively engage with G).2  
The family that matters for the purposes of this paper is the representational one, and I 
wish to draw a further distinction within it. Say that a notion F has conceptual priority over a 
notion G when a previous grasp of F is required to grasp G; on the other hand, a notion F has 
theoretical priority over a notion G when the role played by G in philosophical theorizing is, 
in some important sense, subordinate to the role played by F. While conceptual priority 
pertains to relations between concepts (and the order in which they may be grasped), 
theoretical priority pertains to relations between theoretical roles or statuses of concepts 
employed in a theory.  These are the two notions of priority that I will discuss in the rest of 
the paper. 
                                                     
1 Just a blunt example to drive the point home: Inspector Rebus can only find out about the details of the murder 
by cognitively engaging with the circumstantial evidence available, but the facts that constitute the details of the 
murder did not obtain in virtue of the circumstantial evidence.  
2 For example, facts about biology obtain at least in part in virtue of facts about physics, and yet one can 
cognitively engage with biology without having to cognitively engage with physics. 
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Let’s now come to the propositional/doxastic distinction. It is customary to introduce 
the distinction in the following way: when a subject has some reasons to believe a 
proposition, she has propositional justification to believe that proposition; when a subject has 
some reasons to believe a proposition, and bases her belief on those reasons, she is 
doxastically justified in believing that proposition.3 4 Here’s a quick example. Someone who 
has a reason to believe both that Pablo Neruda was Chilean, and that if Pablo Neruda was 
Chilean, then he was from South America, has (propositional) justification to believe that 
Pablo Neruda was from South America. However, it’s not until one draws the relevant 
inference that one becomes (doxastically) justified in believing that Pablo Neruda was from 
South America. On the other hand, if the agent just described formed the belief that Pablo 
Neruda was from South America out of wishful thinking, she would fail to be doxastically 
justified in believing the proposition in question despite having propositional justification to 
believe it.5 
So, doxastic justification can be characterized as propositional justification plus the 
obtaining of a basing relation (between propositional justification and the relevant belief).6 
This common way of drawing the distinction makes it easy to appreciate that doxastic 
justification entails propositional justification but not vice versa. Such entailment relation, 
and the distinction between conceptual and theoretical priority, will be our starting points. 
Before getting started, however, another important preliminary consideration is in order.  
                                                     
3 See Feldman [2003: 46], Pollock and Cruz [1999: 35–6], and Lasonen-Aarnio [2010: 205–6] for just some of 
the many examples of this way of drawing the distinction. The distinction, and indeed the choice of the terms 
‘propositional’ and ‘doxastic’ goes back at least to Firth [1978: 218]. 
4 I use the preposition ‘to’ to refer to propositional justification (as in ‘S is justified to believe that p’), and the 
preposition ‘in’ to refer to doxastic justification (as in ‘S is justified in believing that p’). 
5 As an anonymous referee helpfully observed, one can have propositional justification to believe p and yet fail 
to be doxastically justified in believing p in at least two different ways: one might fail to form the belief that p, 
or one might fail to base it on the relevant reasons.   
6 Turri [2010: sec. 2] argues that propositional justification plus the basing relation is not sufficient for doxastic 
justification. In addition, he contends, the agent has to use the basis in the right way. While this much seems 
right, there is no need to discuss Turri’s examples for the present purposes. For more on the debate raised by 
Turri’s influential paper see footnote 12 below.  
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Philosophers seem to adopt as their working notion either propositional or doxastic 
justification, depending on the perspective from which they look at epistemic justification. 
While those who, like Goldman [1979] or Kornblith [1980], focus on matters of belief-
formation tend to theorize about doxastic justification, those who, like Conee and Feldman 
[1985] or Kvanvig [2007], tend to conceive of justification as a relation between 
propositional contents normally advance theories about propositional justification. Yet, both 
strands of epistemological theorizing attempt to provide a theory of the same thing: namely, 
epistemic justification. It is thus natural to think that the two notions of justification have a 
common nature and, at the same time, wonder about the relationship between them, including 
the question whether one of the two is more fundamental, or has priority over the other. 
Among other things, one reason why the issue matters is that showing that one of the two 
notions is more fundamental than the other may provide support to the claim that one of the 
two broad approaches to doing epistemology just mentioned cuts deeper at the heart of the 
discipline, as it were. 
In addressing the issue of priority, it is vital not to lose sight of the thought that the 
two notions have a common nature. To achieve that, it is at least heuristically important to 
have the backdrop of a broad characterization of epistemic justification so that a common 
ground between opposing views is established, and a neutral vantage point to impartially 
assess different positions is reached. To attain the common ground, I propose to conceive of 
epistemic justification in terms of epistemic reasons, and to simply characterize such reasons 
as any of the many factors that may play the justificatory role according to the various 
theories of justification. Thus I will use the expression ‘epistemic reasons’ (or just ‘reasons’) 
as a placeholder for a variety of justifying factors such as, for example, the evidence available 
to the subject, the reliability of the process by which the belief was formed, or the coherence 
of a proposition with a larger set of propositions. In speaking of epistemic reasons, I thus 
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intend to remain neutral on what exactly those reasons may be in the specific case. By doing 
so, I aim to avoid the risk of theoretically overloading the notions of propositional or doxastic 
justification in a way that may stack the deck in favour of the priority of one of the two 
notions. For the overarching purposes of this paper, what distinguishes propositional and 
doxastic justification is simply that the latter entails belief while the former does not.7 
However, for ease of discussion, in the two main sections that follow I will focus on 
two specific characterization of propositional and doxastic justification. That shouldn’t 
obfuscate the fact that I will be trying to look at the difference between the two notions from 
a neutral standpoint.8 
2. Conceptual Priority 
I said that doxastic justification entails propositional justification but not vice versa. It might 
be tempting to argue that such entailment relation is explained by the fact that we 
conceptualize doxastic justification as the conjunction of propositional justification and the 
basing relation, and that, since conjuncts have conceptual priority over the conjunction in 
which they appear, propositional justification has conceptual priority over doxastic 
justification.9 
However, it may be objected that a conjunct can only be said to be conceptually prior 
to the conjunction in which it appears if it can be specified without any reference, explicit or 
implicit, to the notion expressed by the conjunction as a whole.10 Otherwise, the 
characterization of the notion that is supposed to be conceptually prior (a conjunct) would 
                                                     
7 I take it that this is also what grounds the distinction in ordinary discourse: for example, it would seem that 
when one criticizes a creationist for failing to believe that dinosaurs existed despite all the fossil evidence 
available, one is criticizing the creationist for failing to be doxastically justified in believing that dinosaurs 
existed despite having propositional justification to that effect. 
8 The reasons for my choices in the next two sections are explained in footnotes 13, 23, and 24 below. 
9 A suggestion along these lines can be found in Fumerton [2006: 36]. Kvanvig and Menzel [1990] may not 
have explicitly mentioned conceptual priority, but have defended the priority of propositional justification as a 
result of the consideration that doxastic justification equals propositional justification plus basing. See Turri 
[2010: 313–4] for a more comprehensive list of philosophers who have argued along similar lines.  
10 Williamson [2000: 3] makes a similar point in a different discussion. 
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appeal to the notion that is supposed to be characterized in terms of it (the conjunction), and it 
couldn’t be conceptually prior. If propositional justification is conceptually prior to doxastic 
justification, we should be able to characterize it without explicitly or implicitly referring to 
doxastic justification. 
The problem is that it’s not clear whether this can be done. If philosophers like 
Bergmann [2006: 4] and Turri [2010: 320] are right, the notion of propositional justification 
is grasped with the help of the notion of doxastic justification. More precisely, the suggestion 
is that a subject has justification to believe a proposition when she’s got reasons such that 
were she to base her belief in that proposition on those reasons, she would be doxastically 
justified.11 12 If so, propositional justification is, at bottom, potential doxastic justification, 
and it does not enjoy conceptual priority over doxastic justification. 
To repeat: a defence of the conceptual priority of propositional justification has to 
face the task of showing that propositional justification can be characterized without 
appealing, explicitly or implicitly, to doxastic justification. Can that be done?  
For the sake of simplicity, let us limit the discussion to one characterization of 
propositional justification that seems well placed to achieve the result. Consider how 
propositional justification may be described within the popular framework according to 
which epistemic justification is understood in terms of evidential likelihood: 
 
                                                     
11 Similar claims had already been advanced by Goldman [1979: 345], Alston [1985: 104], and considered by 
Firth [1978: 220]. Zardini [2014: 34] introduces the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification 
in the same way.  
12 As recalled in footnote 6, Turri argues that propositional justification plus the obtaining of the basing relation 
is not sufficient for doxastic justification. Through the discussion of some examples, he goes on to draw the 
lesson that it is a mistake to endorse the orthodox explanation of doxastic justification in terms of propositional 
justification. Silva [2015] argues that the problem for the orthodox account highlighted by Turri is amenable to a 
rather straightforward solution. While this paper does not engage with Turri’s or Silva’s examples, the present 
section may be described as aiming to vindicate what’s appealing in Turri’s suggestion, and section 3 may be 
broadly portrayed as an attempt to defend the orthodoxy attacked by Turri. See Vahid [2016: sec. 1] for an 
overview of the debate on Turri’s paper. 
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A subject S has justification to believe p on account of some evidence e when there is 
a strong probabilistic connection between e and p: namely, the truth of e makes the 
truth of p very likely.13 
 
It would seem that no appeal to doxastic justification is needed to understand the notion of 
strong probabilistic connection. If that is right, we may have a way to characterize 
propositional justification without appealing to doxastic justification.  
One objection to this suggestion is that if we take a strong probabilistic connection 
between e and p as sufficient for propositional justification, then a subject that has 
justification to believe p, has also justification to believe all the unseen or remote 
probabilistic consequences of p. This may look like a bad result: despite the strong—indeed, 
maximal—probabilistic connection between Peano’s axioms and Fermat’s Last Theorem, it 
seems counterintuitive to say that an agent who has justification to believe Peano’s axioms 
also has justification to believe Fermat’s Last Theorem.14 
To avoid the objection, one might suggest adding the clause that the agent needs to be 
able to grasp the probabilistic connection between e and p, on top of there just being one. 
Other worries aside,15 it doesn’t look as though such a reply can be helpful for the present 
purposes: an agent who can grasp the strong probabilistic connection between e and p is an 
agent who’s in the position to form a justified belief in p on the basis of e.16 And to the extent 
that the connection between e and p is an evidential relation, being in the position to grasp it 
                                                     
13 Let me emphasize again that I intend to remain neutral on what the best characterization of propositional 
justification is. The only reason I am choosing to discuss the characterization in terms of evidential likelihood in 
this section is that, on the face of it, it is rather promising with respect to the task at hand—namely, describing 
propositional justification without appealing, at some level, to doxastic justification. 
14 A worry along these lines is raised in Boghossian [2014: sec. 5], and Turri [2010: 321–2]. 
15 One concern here is that such a move over-intellectualizes the situation. Since some agents seem to form 
justified beliefs without any grasp of the relevant relation of epistemic support—think about justified beliefs of 
very young children, for example—we might wonder whether a notion of propositional justification that 
imposes the requirement that the agent needs to be able to grasp the support relation between e and p can apply 
to all intended agents. For an early complaint along these lines, see Alston [1983: 84ff]. 
16 Assuming the agent possesses e in the first place. 
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may be taken to involve appreciating that one would be warranted to form a belief in p on the 
basis of e: arguably, the very notion of evidence involves reference to some agent for whom a 
piece of evidence would support some attitude.17 If so, this way of replying to the objection 
seems to reveal that the characterization of propositional justification provided appeals—at 
least implicitly—to the notion of (potential) doxastic justification. 
The advocate of the conceptual priority of propositional justification might want to 
take a step back at this stage, and observe that, in an interesting sense, the ordinary agent who 
has justification to believe Peano’s axioms has justification to believe Fermat’s Last Theorem 
too; it’s just a pity that she’s not able to avail herself of it. The notion of justification invoked 
here is one that extends beyond the limits of the subject’s cognitive or doxastic capacities—
the underlying suggestion being that epistemic justification can be understood as a source of 
evaluative ideals that we should do our best to achieve, rather than as a source of obligatory 
tasks that we ought to achieve. If so, propositional justification applies primarily to strongly 
idealized subjects—subjects able to derive Fermat’s Last Theorem from Peano’s axioms. A 
view along these lines has been recently defended, for example, by Smithies [2012: sec. 2], 
and Ichikawa and Jarvis [2013: 163].18 
Let’s call the notion of justification just sketched ‘objective propositional 
justification’. Following Ichikawa and Jarvis [ibid.], let’s agree that it ‘concerns the objective 
degree of support that a subject’s evidence confers on a proposition.’ Roughly speaking, we 
might suggest that the weaker notion—the one that sets only achievable goals, and that we 
might now call ‘ordinary propositional justification’—can be understood as flowing from it. 
We might say that the subject has objective propositional justification to believe all the 
propositions that are probabilistically supported to the required degree by the evidence at her 
                                                     
17 More on this point in a minute: see the upcoming discussion on the thought that evidence can be evidence 
only for some epistemic agent. 
18 See also Conee and Feldman [1985: 86–7]. 
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disposal, but that she’s got ordinary propositional justification only for the subset of 
propositions that her cognitive and doxastic abilities enable her to believe with justification. 
We have thus distinguished two notions of propositional justification.19 But let us go back to 
the issue of conceptual priority: can objective propositional justification be conceptually prior 
to doxastic justification? 
It does not look like it. To see why, we need to reflect on the fact that the notion of 
probability in play in the characterization of (the evidential support involved in) objective 
propositional justification is an epistemic one: it is probability measured relatively to a body 
of evidence. I have called it ‘objective’ only in the sense that it is not constrained by the 
subject’s cognitive or doxastic limits, but it remains constrained by the delimitation of a body 
of evidence e over which the probability of the relevant p has to be determined. 
 But arguably, evidence can be evidence only for some epistemic agent: it would seem 
that the very notion of evidence presupposes that there is some subject for whom a given 
piece of information speaks (or would speak) in favour of some proposition p. While it might 
not be very clear what exactly counts as evidence (propositions, events, objects, experiences . 
. . ), it seems clear that whatever counts as evidence is something that, when possessed by a 
subject, supports a given attitude (belief, disbelief, suspension, some credence) of that subject 
towards a proposition p. Of course, the relevant notion of subject is very wide here: the 
subject in possession of the evidence needn’t be an ordinary human being, but it may be the 
extremely idealized agent who has infinite logical power and can see the link between 
Peano’s axiom and Fermat’s last theorem, or even a collective agent (say, the scientific 
                                                     
19 The two notions of propositional justification have also been distinguished in Ichikawa and Jarvis [2013: 163] 
and Coliva [2014: 254]. However, the terms used to describe the properties differ. What I call ‘objective 
propositional justification’ is called simply ‘propositional justification’ by Ichikawa and Jarvis, and simply 
‘propositional warrant’ by Coliva. What I call ‘ordinary propositional justification’ is called ‘ex-ante 
justification’ by Ichikawa and Jarvis, and ‘warrant that is available to the subject’ by Coliva. In general, there 
seems to be some terminological confusion in the literature: contrary to Ichikawa and Jarvis and Coliva, some 
philosophers, like Boghossian [2014] and Turri [2010] use the expression ‘propositional justification’ to refer to 
what I call ‘ordinary propositional justification’.  
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community). But what seems to make no sense is to talk of evidence for no agent 
whatsoever—that is, evidence that does not rely on the idea that if some agent were in 
possession of it, then that agent would be under pressure to adopt some doxastic attitude 
towards some proposition. As Kelly [2016: sec. 1, emphasis mine] puts it: ‘evidence, 
whatever else it is, is the kind of thing which can make a difference to what one is justified in 
believing or . . . what is reasonable for one to believe.’   
If the foregoing goes along the right lines, what makes a piece of information a piece 
of evidence is the fact that an agent—no matter how idealized—takes it (or can take it) to 
support the truth of some proposition. Otherwise, a piece of information is just a piece of 
information. Surely, that piece of information will be statistically related to another, but a 
statistical relation, in and of itself, is not an evidential relation. Not yet, at least. It’s only 
when some epistemic agent—again, even just a highly idealized one—reads a statistical 
relation as an evidential relation that a statistical relation becomes an evidential relation. It’s 
the epistemic agent, loaded with her own background information and specific epistemic 
goal(s), who determines which proposition (say, of the two that are statistically related) is 
evidence for which.20 If so, the probabilistic support that e gives to p in the proposed 
characterization of propositional justification is a measure of some agent’s degree of 
justification to believe p. 
And when does such agent have justification to believe p? When she’s got reasons 
such that if she were to believe p and base her belief that p on those reasons, she would be 
justified in believing that p. But that’s potential doxastic justification, and being potential 
doxastic justification for a highly idealized subject does not make it less so. As Smithies 
                                                     
20 Here’s an example. Suppose that there is a strong statistical correlation between ‘S speaks good English’ and 
‘S is British’. For an agent who, through a quick chat, is trying to identify the British citizens in a group of 
mixed nationalities, the first proposition may be good evidence for the second; for an agent who is trying to 
figure out who might speak English by reading details about the members of the mixed group on some 
document, the second proposition may be good evidence for the first.  
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[2012: 280] acknowledges, ‘the propositions that one has justification to believe are those 
propositions that one would believe if one were to be idealized in relevant respects.’  If so, the 
conclusion seems to be that a grasp of the notion of doxastic justification is needed to grasp 
the notion of propositional justification. If that is right, propositional justification is not 
conceptually prior to doxastic justification. 
To sum up, we may think that grasping the notion of objective propositional 
justification needs to appeal to doxastic justification because it requires appealing to an 
idealized agent who, from her own epistemic perspective, can tell what piece of information 
is evidence for another. The directionality that is needed by the evidential relation (in virtue 
of which e can be said to be evidence for p rather than the other way round) is something that 
can only be provided by an agent—no matter how idealized we take it to be. Indeed, as the 
example made in footnote 20 should make clear, the same point applies with respect to 
ordinary propositional justification. The upshot seems to be that understanding what 
propositional justification is relies on imagining some sort of agent that could, would, or 
should believe the proposition in question. Propositional justification does not appear to have 
conceptual priority over doxastic justification.   
But what about those (objective) Bayesian accounts of propositional justification that 
explicitly reject the idea that evidential probability boils down to the credences of a perfectly 
rational agent in possession of the relevant evidence, such as the one advanced by 
Williamson [2000: ch. 10]? It’s not clear that someone who sympathizes with such Bayesian 
accounts would be persuaded by the foregoing considerations. More generally, how do the 
foregoing considerations bear upon such accounts of propositional justification?  
It is important to realize that I’m not suggesting that the foregoing considerations 
show that an appeal to an ideal agent (and thus an appeal to potential doxastic justification) is 
needed to develop a theory of propositional justification in terms of probability. That would 
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be to suggest that doxastic justification enjoys theoretical priority, and I will deal with 
theoretical priority only in the next section. What the discussion of this section shows is 
rather that an appeal to an ideal agent (and thus a grasp of the notion of doxastic justification) 
is needed to come to terms with the notion of propositional justification itself, before the 
theory of propositional justification in terms of probability is even sketched. We may say that 
an appeal to doxastic justification is needed to explain what a theory of propositional 
justification in terms of evidential probability is a theory of, but the appeal to doxastic 
justification needn’t be part of the theory itself.21 In other words, even if we decide to account 
for propositional justification in terms of abstract relations between propositions, in 
explaining what those abstract relations and propositions are a theory of, we’ll need to appeal 
to some agent for whom those relations would obtain. Thus, the claim that doxastic 
justification has conceptual priority over propositional justification is not meant to be in 
tension with probabilistic accounts of propositional justification that do not rely, in the theory 
itself, on the notion of ideal rational agent.  
In short, understanding what a Bayesian account of propositional justification is in the 
first place requires appealing to some agent engaged in the project of forming true beliefs, 
and this suggests that even Bayesianism has to bow to the conceptual priority of doxastic 
justification, as it were. Importantly, that’s not to deny that a Bayesian account of the 
propositions that are supported by one’s evidence may be given without reference to the 
beliefs that those relations would support. As already noted, the appeal to such beliefs may be 
made outside of the theory, and it’s only needed to grasp what the theory is a theory of—
namely, epistemic justification—without actually playing a role in the theory itself. To my 
mind, this speaks in favour of the conceptual priority of doxastic justification. At the same 
                                                     
21 That is why I did not have to engage with any specific probabilistic theory of justification in order to make the 
point.   
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time, it may suggest that the relation of priority could be reversed when we turn to theoretical 
priority, but let us not anticipate things. 
At this stage, one may observe that even if what has been said so far is broadly right, 
it still does not establish the conceptual priority of doxastic justification. To do so, what is 
needed is a characterization of doxastic justification which does not appeal, even implicitly, 
to propositional justification. I shall not attempt the task here, but I think there are reasons to 
be optimistic about the project. Consider the following. 
One of the things that the foregoing discussion might be taken to suggest is that, 
broadly speaking, the notion of doxastic justification is a development of the notion of actual 
justified belief, and that, in turn, the notion of propositional justification is a development of 
the notion of potential justified belief. Now, to the extent that grasp of the notion of an actual 
G can be had prior to, and independently of, a grasp of the notion of a potential G, doxastic 
justification can be grasped prior to, and independently of, propositional justification. Just 
like we can understand what it means to speak English independently of understanding what 
it means to have the potential to speak English, or we can understand what it means to be a 
professional football player independently of understanding what it means to have the 
potential to become a professional football player, we can presumably understand what it 
means to have a justified belief (doxastic justification) independently of understanding what 
it means to have a potential justified belief (propositional justification). 
If the foregoing is along the right lines, we have some reasons to expect that doxastic 
justification can be shown to be conceptually prior to propositional justification, but not vice 
versa.  
One may further object that I have not shown that the point holds if we opt for 
characterizations of propositional justification other than the one in terms of evidential 
likelihood. Agreed: it is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a discussion of all possible 
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notions of propositional (and indeed doxastic) justification. The goal of the section was to 
offer some initial motivation for the view that doxastic justification enjoys conceptual priority 
by showing that one notion of propositional justification that seemed well placed to be 
broadly characterized without any implicit appeal to doxastic justification, under closer 
inspection, does seem to rely on doxastic justification. 
3. Theoretical Priority 
When we turn our attention to theoretical priority, however, the order of priority appears to 
differ. In the first section I suggested that a notion F has theoretical priority over a notion G 
when the role played by G in philosophical theorizing is subordinate to—or at any rate 
depends on—the role played by F. Recall that while conceptual priority pertains to relations 
between concepts, theoretical priority pertains to relations between roles of concepts in a 
theory. What seems clear is that theoretical priority does not entail conceptual priority.22 If 
the present investigation moves along right lines, the case of the relation between 
propositional and doxastic justification reveals that conceptual priority does not entail 
theoretical priority either. 
To suggest that propositional justification has theoretical priority over doxastic 
justification is to say that a theory of the beliefs that one is justified in holding relies (maybe 
only implicitly) on an a theory of the propositions that are supported by one’s reasons, 
regardless of, and prior to, whether one goes on to form the relevant beliefs or not.23 
                                                     
22 For example, the concept of steering wheel has theoretical priority over the notion of turning in a theory of car 
driving (the theory will say that one has to operate the steering wheel in order to turn the car), but it is not 
conceptually prior to it (one can grasp the notion of turning without grasping the notion of steering wheel). 
Similarly, as we saw in the previous section, a Bayesian theory might assign theoretical priority to propositional 
justification, but that doesn’t show that propositional justification also enjoys conceptual priority. 
23 At the risk of coming across as pedantic, let me recall that the relevant notion of reasons is very broad. I do 
not wish to suggest that propositional justification is in this section still to be understood in terms of evidential 
likelihood. Rather, at this stage it should be understood in the most theoretically neutral way: namely, as the 
justification that does not entail belief (regardless of what general theory of epistemic justification one might 
favour). The characterization of justification in terms of evidential likelihood was only adopted for the purposes 
of section 2 and, as it will be clear soon, for the purposes of section 3 it will be helpful to adopt a different view 
of justification. 
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Examples of theories that grant theoretical priority to propositional justification are 
provided by Kvanvig’s propositionalism, or by Conee’s and Feldman’s evidentialism. Such 
theories take their main goal to be that of describing the relation of evidential support holding 
between propositional contents, and account for the beliefs that are justified for one by 
appealing to the relation of evidential support holding between propositions. Thus, in 
Kvanvig’s propositionalism and Conee’s and Feldman’s evidentialism the theoretical priority 
of propositional justification is part of the programmatic approach. 
But the issue that matters for our purposes is whether the theoretical priority of 
propositional justification is imposed by the subject matter, as it were. The interesting 
question is whether all satisfactory accounts of the beliefs that one is justified in holding have 
to rely, at some point, on an account of what propositions are supported by one’s reasons. 
One may want to argue for the theoretical priority of propositional justification on the 
grounds that propositional justification enjoys metaphysical priority—in the sense described 
in section 1—over doxastic justification. Focusing on an evidentialist account of justification, 
one might suggest that, since one can only base a belief in p on the basis of evidence e if one 
has got e in the first place, doxastic-justification-facts (roughly, facts about the use of some 
evidence e in forming the belief that p) obtain in part in virtue of propositional-justification-
facts (roughly, facts about evidence possession). If so, one may argue that any adequate 
theory of doxastic justification has to respect this feature and at bottom rely in some way on a 
theory of propositional justification. Tempting as this line of argument might be, it cannot 
serve the present purposes.  
First of all, it relies on a theoretically loaded general characterization of justification 
in terms of evidence, but as we already observed, one needn’t characterize epistemic 
justification in terms of evidence. Thus, a way of establishing the theoretical priority of 
propositional justification relying on an evidentialist account of justification would not have 
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the general significance that we are looking for. We are looking for some initial reason to 
believe that all accounts of doxastic justification have to rely, at some point, on propositional 
justification, not just that there is one account that does so (and it would be rather 
unsurprising that an evidentialist account of justification delivers that result).24 Secondly, it is 
not in general the case that a metaphysical notion of priority determines a corresponding 
representational priority: it’s at least conceivable that even if doxastic-justification facts occur 
at least in part in virtue of propositional-justification facts, an account of what beliefs one is 
justified in holding needn’t rely on an account of what propositions one has justification to 
believe.25 
I have to admit that I do not have an argument to the effect that, in general, 
propositional justification is theoretically prior to doxastic justification. Once again, we’ll 
have to make do with considerations providing some abductive reasons for optimism. My 
suggestion is that the likely theoretical priority of propositional justification may be defended 
by recalling how one important theory of epistemic justification that started with the ambition 
of accounting for doxastic justification independently of propositional justification had to, at 
one point, appeal to propositional justification in order to accomplish its task. 
                                                     
24 Note, however, that the focus on the evidentialist account in the previous section was warranted: had we 
found that the broad evidentialist view considered could vindicate the conceptual priority of propositional 
justification, we would have falsified the claim that all general characterizations of justification assign 
conceptual priority to doxastic justification. That was the claim under investigation in the previous section, and 
the focus on evidentialism was due to the fact that it offered a prima facie good candidate to deliver that result. 
By contrast, in this section, the claim that we will be trying to falsify is that all general characterization of 
justification assign theoretical priority to propositional justification, and we will work with a general account of 
justification that has at least some prima facie credibility to successfully carry out the task: namely, reliabilism.  
25 As suggested in Section 1, it is not obvious that the way in which we think or talk about reality (or about a 
specific subject matter) should mirror the hierarchical relations that hold in reality itself. If so, metaphysical 
priority, in and of itself, does not guarantee representational priority (see footnote 2). And since I have 
characterized theoretical priority as a species of representational priority, the theoretical priority of 
propositional justification over doxastic justification would not merely follow from establishing that 
propositional justification has metaphysical priority.  
While a discussion of metaphysical priority goes beyond the scope of this paper, it is worthwhile noting 
that the view recently explored in Vahid [2016]—according to which propositional justification is a 
dispositional property and doxastic justification its manifestation—may be seen as ascribing metaphysical 
priority to propositional justification (to the extent that the relation between a disposition and the occurrence of 
the relevant manifestation is characterized as distinctively metaphysical in nature). See Ichikawa and Jenkins 
[forthcoming: secs 3-4] for some discussion of the relationship between the two main families of priority.  
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The theory I am alluding at is Goldman’s process-reliabilism. Here are two telling 
passages from Goldman’s declaration of intent: 
 
The aim of this essay is to sketch a theory of justified belief . . ., one that explains in a 
general way why certain beliefs are counted as justified and other as unjustified. 
[1979: 333] 
I do not even assume that when a belief is justified there is something ‘possessed’ by 
the believer which can be called a ‘justification’.  
[Ibid.: 334] 
 
On the face of it, Goldman sets out to provide a theory of doxastic justification which is 
independent of a theory of propositional justification. Let’s see how, despite the original 
stated goal, Goldman comes to acknowledge the crucial theoretical role played by 
propositional justification. 
Broadly speaking, process-reliabilism has it that a belief is justified in case it is 
caused by a process that is actually reliable, or that it is generally believed to be reliable. 
Thus, the theory has a diachronic understanding of justification: the justificational status of a 
belief depends on its causal history. Now, to the extent that propositional justification is often 
characterized within a synchronic framework—the justificational status of a proposition is 
commonly taken to depend entirely on the reasons available to the subject at a given time t—
one might wonder whether reliabilism can account for propositional justification at all. After 
all, propositional justification is commonly described as something that is possessed by the 
subject (typically exemplified by a piece of evidence), and it’s not clear what the subject can 
be said to possess in a diachronic account of justification: belief-forming processes are not 
the sort of thing that one can possess. 
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Of course, reliabilism can account for propositional justification. Such justification is 
better described as being available to—rather than as being possessed by—the subject. We 
can say that a subject S has justification to believe a proposition p when there is a reliable 
belief-forming process or operation available to S such that if S applied that operation to her 
cognitive state at time t, she would be justified in believing p at time t+n [Ibid.: 345].
26 27 It’s 
worth stopping a moment on this characterization of propositional justification to make sure 
we avoid possible confusions.  
One might worry that, to the extent that belief-forming processes are something 
broadly psychological, the availability of a belief-forming process supporting a given 
proposition p cannot really be used to characterize propositional justification. Rather, the 
notion of available reliable belief-forming process that would lead one to believe p should be 
seen as an alternative (though counterfactual) doxastic justification. But remember that in 
section 1 we agreed that our neutral vantage point requires us to conceive of propositional 
justification as simply the justification that does not entail (actual) belief.28 And within a 
reliabilist framework that is the justification provided by a merely available (that is, not 
actually used) belief-forming process. Thus, the objection that a merely available belief-
forming process cannot be considered a kind of propositional justification because it is a 
broadly psychological notion relies on assumptions about the nature of propositional 
justification29 that go beyond what we are warranted to accept in the present context of 
                                                     
26 This is something very similar to what an advocate of the conceptual priority of doxastic justification says 
propositional justification is; compare Bergmann’s and Turri’s suggestion mentioned in section 2 above. 
27 One might wonder what it is for a belief-forming process to be available to the subject. Goldman himself 
admits that the issue is somewhat vague, but there seem to be some good examples. Suppose that, whilst having 
a conversation with someone, you are distractedly watching a dog playing with a ball in the park. As it happens, 
you do not form any belief about the dog, but since you are looking at it, there is a clear sense in which you have 
propositional justification to believe that there is a dog playing in the park: the proposition ‘there is a dog 
playing in the park’ is within reach of a reliable belief-forming process of yours (which involves vision). 
28 Indeed, Goldman himself [2008: 64] draws the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification in 
these terms. 
29 Such as, for example, that propositional justification needs to be understood as an abstract relation between 
propositions. 
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theoretical neutrality: namely, that propositional justification is that kind of justification that 
does not entail belief. With that in mind, there should be no further objections to the proposed 
reliabilist account of propositional justification.30  
But in order to defend the theoretical priority of propositional justification, we have to 
show that reliabilism needs to rely on an account of propositional justification, not just that it 
can provide one. 
Consider the following hypothetical scenario. Suppose that the subject S is told—say, 
for the sake of some experiment—by an eye-doctor that her vision is not functioning well, 
while in fact S’s vision is working fine. Suppose further that, despite the information acquired 
from the doctor, out of stubbornness, S keeps believing what her vision suggests to be the 
case. Since S’s vision is actually working fine, the beliefs in question are caused by a reliable 
process. Thus, the simple reliabilist theory presented above predicts that they are justified. 
However, since S blatantly ignores some prima facie good reasons to distrust her vision—the 
eye-doctor’s words—intuitively, those beliefs are not held in good intellectual conscience, 
and shouldn’t count as justified (cf. Goldman [1979: 343–4]).  
To reply to an objection along these very lines, Goldman proposed the following re-
elaboration of reliabilism: if the agent’s belief that p at t is produced by a reliable process, 
and there is no reliable process available to the agent such that, if it had been used in addition 
to the process actually used, it would have resulted in the agent not believing p at t, then the 
agent’s belief that p is justified [ibid.].  
Back to the example: since there is a reliable process that, if used, would have 
resulted in S’s not believing what her vision suggested—say, the process of recalling what 
                                                     
30 See Turri [2010], and the references offered in footnote 11 for very similar characterizations of propositional 
justification. See also Becker [sec. 2.a] for the attribution of the propositional/doxastic distinction to Goldman. 
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was previously said by the doctor—the refined version of reliabilism does not predict that S’s 
visual beliefs are justified.  
What’s important for our purposes is that the overall lesson of the example, and of the 
proposed refinement of reliabilism that follows it, is that—as Goldman [ibid.] himself 
acknowledges—an account of what beliefs are actually justified depends also on an account 
of what beliefs could, and should, have been justified. In other words, doxastic justification 
theoretically depends on propositional justification. Or at least, we have some good prima 
facie reasons to think that it does. 
4. Conclusion 
I have offered some reasons to think that while propositional justification enjoys theoretical 
priority, doxastic justification has conceptual priority. So, in different senses, both the 
advocates of the priority of propositional justification and the advocates of the priority of 
doxastic justification are right. Since the two notions of priority here discussed concern both 
the way in which we think and talk about a given subject matter—they belong to what 
Ichikawa and Jenkins call ‘representational families’ of priority—we may think that, with 
respect to the question of how we think and talk about epistemic justification, propositional 
and doxastic justification stand in a relation of intertwinement. If so, neither notion can be 
properly said to have priority over the other without some clarifications along the lines that 
have been proposed in this paper. If I were to summarize the point of the article in one 
sentence, I’d say: while an appeal to doxastic justification seems to be needed to explain or 
understand what a theory of propositional justification even is, a theory of doxastic 
justification that ignores propositional justification would seem to fail to account for some 
crucial aspects of epistemic justification. 
While the present paper offers some initial motivation for the combination of views 
proposed, it does not conclusively establishes that doxastic justification enjoys conceptually 
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priority while propositional justification has theoretical priority. However, it does show that 
two characterizations of propositional and doxastic justification that might be at first taken to 
falsify the combination of views sketched, under close scrutiny, fail to do so. 
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